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Abstract: This article takes issue with recent references to the British nineteenth century 
campaign for the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade to Brazil that serve to bolster 
interventionist or imperialist agendas.  In particular, such accounts reproduce two and a half 
myths about the campaign: that it can serve as a model for the present age; that the success of 
the campaign can be explained through the actions of the intervening party alone (with a 
corresponding neglect of those of the „target‟ state); and the half-myth that the campaign‟s 
success was due to military action (at the expense of institutional (legal) and normative 
factors and the capacity of the target state).  I argue instead that this case – and interventions 
more generally – would benefit from an analysis that considers the role of force in relation to 
a series of residual institutional and cultural constraints within the liberal state and to political 
conditions in the target state.  In light of the complexities and contingencies that these factors 
present the underlying lesson is that military force should be used sparingly, if at all.    
 
The British campaign for the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade to Brazil was the most 
costly international moral action recorded in modern history:
2
 it lasted for forty years, 
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incurred the loss of around 5,000 British seamen (mostly from disease) and cost an average of 
2% of British national income annually.  For social-scientists this level of resource 
expenditure makes it an „extreme‟ example of humanitarian intervention and therein 
intrinsically interesting as a case in which the politics and dynamics of intervention stand to 
be more starkly exposed than in less costly cases and therein prospectively illuminating for 
the study of „humanitarian intervention‟ or „military humanitarianism‟ more widely.3  But 
also, the case has in recent years been rediscovered by advocates of liberal interventionism 
and of empire who see in the British campaign a positive example for our own times.  
Typically, the campaign is represented as a successful, robust and long haul endeavour that 
stands in marked contrast to the moral uncertainties, weak or fragile political will and high 
risk aversion of the present.  Yet contemporary analogies with the anti-slave trade campaign 
tend to be brief and the message or lessons drawn or inferred misleading in important 
respects.  There is, then, both a social scientific and a policy justification for re-examining the 
campaign and its „lessons‟.   
In particular, the case illustrates the how liberal institutions and culture serve to condition the 
possibilities and limits of such interventions in ways which resonate with recent experience.  
The case suggests the need for liberals to use force sparingly and to rethink alternatives to the 
military dimension, whilst at the same time being aware that these are unlikely to offer any 
easy „solutions‟.   
Mythologising the anti-slave trade campaign 
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This first part of the article identifies two-and-a-half „myths‟ that are apparent in current 
representations of the anti-slave trade campaign and shows that they offer only partial or 
misleading insights.  The notion of „myth‟ is used here to refer to a representation of an 
historical event or episode that exists in the public domain but which is of limited or 
superficial accuracy when considered in the light of historical scholarship.  The first myth is 
that the campaign can serve as a model for interventions in the present day.  Closer analysis, 
however, shows the limits of this comparison due both to the selective nature of certain 
contemporary representations and to changes in the character of democratic politics, society 
and warfare in the past two centuries.  The second myth is that the „intervening‟ Power was 
solely responsible for abolishing the trade.  Whilst several recent accounts focus solely on the 
role of the intervening Power, richer historical analyses tend to recognise the vital role of the 
target state.  The half-myth is that it was the use of (naval) force – and in particular the 
unilateral, illegal use of naval force – that achieved the aims.  In fact, whilst the use of force 
did eventually play a key role (hence the half myth), for long periods it was ineffective and 
ultimately its efficacy was closely related to the development of state capacity and elite 
calculations within Brazil itself.   
The centre-left British Labour politician, Lord Clive Soley, situates contemporary military 
interventions against dictatorial regimes in a liberal teleological framework in which „the 
world has been gradually moving towards greater commitment to democracy and the rule of 
law.... As long as we don‟t lose our nerve we may look back on this period as a time when we 
finally consigned brutal dictators to the dustbin of history‟.  Aware that the experience in Iraq 
has given military intervention a „seriously bad name‟ he asks whether it is worth it.  His 
answer is to cite the British nineteenth century slave trade campaign.  That too was at times 
unpopular and „much of what Britain actually did then was illegal‟: „just change the names 
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and the dates and you could be reading about our attempts to put an end to dictatorships‟. 4  
Clearly, Soley regards the anti-slave trade campaign as an example of what robust, unilateral 
action can achieve.  His account, however, has no mention of the significance of political 
developments in the „target‟ state and despite referring to economic and political options the 
focus is very much on the military dimension.  
 
The conservative historian Niall Ferguson‟s representation of the anti-slave trade campaign 
may be understood in terms of his overarching argument that empires – or at least the British 
empire – was a positive civilisational force and that the United States should in the present 
age recognise and cultivate its own liberal imperial mission.  In his account of the Atlantic 
trade‟s abolition it is a) British agency and b) military (naval) power that is to the fore:  
„If the British wished to abolish the slave trade, they simply sent the navy…. If the 
British wished the Brazilians to follow their example by abolishing the slave trade, 
they simply sent a gunboat.  That was what Lord Palmerston did in 1848; by 
September 1850 Brazil had passed a law abolishing the trade‟.5   
This simple causal logic is, however, deeply misleading.  Brazil had in fact criminalised the 
trade in 1831 but the law was wholly ineffective – in fact the trade boomed as the decade 
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progressed.
6
  The question shifts, then, to why the law was effective in the 1850s but not the 
1830s?  As discussed below the answer requires close attention to the Brazilian dimension – 
and in particular to matters of state development and elite policy making – which is wholly 
overlooked in the above accounts.  Others too, such as the former British Conservative 
Foreign Secretary Lord Douglas Hurd have also overlooked the Brazilian dimension.  His 
own term (1989-95) was marked by a reluctance to intervene militarily in Bosnia and whilst 
his account places greater emphasis upon the network of treaties than do the interventionists 
and imperialists there is still no mention of developments in the target state.
7
 
The problem with such accounts is that they overlook the „interactive‟ nature of many 
interventions which actually require some form of cooperation – even if this be coerced 
cooperation – between the intervener and target government (or faction within the target 
state) and downplays the importance of the political dimension.  It is not only that such 
accounts may encourage military adventurism; they are also unhelpful for understanding the 
utility of force.  The discussion returns to this theme after first reviewing the campaign itself.   
 
The campaign and its challenges 
„I fear we cannot without experiment assume success to be certain‟. 8 
 Peel to Aberdeen (January 1844) 
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Besides being a „humanitarian‟9 intervention the British campaign was also a „liberal‟ 
intervention.  That is to say, independent of its particular ends the campaign was subject to 
the political institutions and processes of policy-making in a liberal state such as 
parliamentary government, party-political competition, an independent legislature and such 
associated societal pressures as a dynamic civil society and free press.  Whilst Britain was not 
„democratic‟ in this period – only 1 in 7 adult males had the vote after the 1832 Reform Act – 
this was the period when the middle classes and nonconformists were actively challenging 
the old Toryism such that the combination of institutional and cultural factors confirm 
Britain‟s increasingly liberal character.         
 
A vital initial question, given the seemingly limited public support for intervention in the 
present age, is how it was politically possible for Britain to sustain the campaign over forty 
years when for much of this period it was of limited effectiveness, high cost, faced declining 
public support and after 1830 faced with the alternation of Whig and Tory governments?  
Kaufmann and Pape point primarily to the finely balanced electoral competition between the 
two main parties which gave the anti-slavery lobby a political significance and impact it may 
not otherwise have enjoyed.  From 1835 onwards, „British governments, whether Whig or 
Conservative, could not resist abolitionist demands absent countervailing mass mobilization – 
which occurred just once, over sugar duties in 1846‟. 10  Besides this, Palmerston as Whig 
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Foreign Secretary was personally committed to the abolition campaign and government 
leaders generally sought to avoid the perceived loss of prestige and credibility should Britain 
abandon its efforts.  Also, the establishment of the Slave Trade Department of the Foreign 
Office in 1821 institutionalised the issue and created a point of access and influence for the 
abolitionist societies.  The question of whether there is an equivalent political base for a 
protracted humanitarian campaign in the present age will be discussed in the final section of 
this paper.   
The predominant government approach comprised a treaty based naval stop and search 
regime known as the preventive system.  This had only limited success as patrols were 
frequently outrun or outwitted by the slavers, leading to the adoption of various alternatives, 
all of which were beset by their own internal tensions and contradictions.   
From the outset the government‟s conduct and development of the campaign was closely 
interwoven with international legal considerations.  The 1807 Abolition Act had made it 
illegal for British ships to participate in the slave trade but did nothing to stop ships of other 
flags.  During the Napoleonic Wars Britain countered this through exercise of its belligerent 
rights to search and capture enemy slave ships and initially sought to extend this action into 
peacetime, particularly after the failure at the Congress of Vienna to gain more than a non-
binding general declaration that the trade was „repugnant to the principles of humanity and 
universal morality‟.  By this point most of the major slave trading nations had already 
prohibited or agreed to prohibit the transatlantic trade leaving Spain and Portugal as the 
principal perpetrators.  However, the unilateralist strategy was overruled by the judiciary in 
the landmark Le Louis (1817) judgement which upheld the principle of state sovereignty 
through ruling that under customary international law no such right of search and capture 
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existed: no government, argued Sir William Scott, could „force the way to the liberation of 
Africa by trampling on the independence of other states in Europe‟.11  
Britain, then, was in the position of requiring individual bilateral treaties in order to put the 
right of stop and search on a sound legal footing.  However, powers such as the United States 
and France refused to allow British vessels such rights with the effect that the slave traders 
were able to exploit the differential legal regime through changing flags or falsifying papers.  
Even Portugal, despite the fact that Britain had facilitated the passage of its entire Royal 
Court to Brazil when it was threatened by Napoleon in 1807/8, granted Britain rights of naval 
stop and search only north of the equator and outside of territorial waters in the treaties of 
1815 and 1817.
12
  The 1817 treaty did, however, establish a judicial procedure whereby 
captured ships were taken before one of two Anglo-Portuguese Courts of Mixed Commission 
at either Rio de Janeiro or in Sierra Leone composed of a judge from each state.
13
  A further 
opportunity arose in 1826 when Britain made recognition of Brazilian independence 
conditional on the extension of its non-reciprocal commercial privileges (which was a cause 
of resentment locally) and a commitment to criminalise the participation of Brazilian subjects 
in the slave trade with effect from 1831.  However, it was Article 1 of the treaty that was 
later to prove particularly valuable to the British in declaring such participation after that date 
to be „deemed and treated as piracy‟.  This raised the prospect of warships of any country 
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seizing slave ships on the High Seas, regardless of what flags they were flying, for trial at the 
captor‟s own tribunals.14  
That there was a glut of slave imports prior to criminalisation of the trade in Brazil did not 
stop the trade expanding in the latter half of the decade in response to booming European 
demand for cotton, sugar and coffee.  According to Lloyd only about 10% of the traffic was 
stopped
15
 and even then there remained a chance of acquittal at the courts of mixed 
commission depending upon whether there was a British or a Brazilian judge.
16
  This patent 
lack of success drove divisions between abolitionists on the question of means.  Thomas 
Fowell Buxton, Wilberforce‟s successor as leader of the anti-slavery group in parliament, 
showed in his pamphlets The Slave Trade and The Remedy (1838) that despite the naval 
patrols and treaties the expanded trade was having increasingly serious consequences for 
Africa as more wars were being fought to maintain the supply of slaves. If one took into 
account the high level of deaths from disease associated with the trade then Africa was losing 
approximately 400,000 persons a year to the Atlantic trade, which was twice that of half a 
century earlier.
17
 It was becoming increasingly clear to contemporaries that the preventive 
system was a conceptual as well as an operational failure, which is not to say that alternative 
approaches would necessarily fare any better.
18
   
                                                          
14
 Bethell, Abolition, p. 60. 
15
 Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade, pp. 61, 275, xii. 
16
 Bethell, Abolition, pp. 122-150. 
17 Howard Temperley, British Antislavery, 1833-1870 (London: Longman, 1972), p. 50. 
18
 But see E. Philip D LeVeen, „A Quantitative Analysis of the Impact of British Suppression Policies on the 
Volume of the Nineteenth Century Atlantic Slave Trade‟, in Stanley L. Engerman and Eugene D. Genovese 
10 
 
Buxton‟s largely aristocratic „Society for the Extinction of the Slave Trade and the 
Civilisation of Africa‟ was formed in 1839 to mobilise support for a fresh approach that paid 
greater attention to the socio-cultural conditions that fed supply.  His scheme entailed the 
conclusion of treaties with local chiefs to develop agriculture and commerce in place of 
slaving and the establishment by the British government of an infrastructure of trading posts, 
transportation and model farms.  Melbourne and Palmerston were both sceptical but the 
government could not afford to lose the support of the humanitarians in parliament and 
pledged to send a mission to explore the Niger in search of a suitable area of land.  The crew, 
however, were struck by fever and the model farm experiment degenerated such that this 
alternative to the preventive system was soon discredited.
19
  
The more middle-class British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society (BFASS) founded by Joseph 
Sturge in 1833 tended to be pacifist, with a large Quaker membership, and more rigidly 
principled as was apparent in their opposition to both the government‟s preventive system 
and to compensation for slave-holders following emancipation. Their alternative to the 
preventive system was the abolition of slavery itself and to this end they held well-attended 
World Anti-Slavery Conventions in 1840 and 1843.  Such ambitions were, however, thwarted 
by the prior question of whether or not to admit women delegates as full participants.  They 
decided against.  As Temperley notes, the British (as the American) anti-slavery movement 
became marked by factionalism, tactical and personal differences and after the abolition of 
slavery in the sugar colonies in 1833 increasing frustration.
20
  Thus whilst civil society was 
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essential for sustaining the political base of the campaign, it failed spectacularly to generate 
practical alternative models of abolition.   
The most radical alternative to the preventive system, however, and one which ran directly 
against the British policy of minimizing commitments, was governmental annexation of the 
territories generating slaves.  The annexation of Lagos in 1861 was a direct consequence of 
the limits of military intervention as a political instrument in that it has failed to resolve the 
issue of African Christians being enslaved and sold across the Atlantic.  Under pressure from 
the Church Missionary Society the British government intervened in 1851 to install a more 
cooperative leader in Lagos and increase „legitimate trade‟, but this only led to further 
interventions in 1853 and 1861 and then to the outright annexation of Lagos.
21
 But then, as 
now,  annexation was hardly a strategy that could be applied whenever a humanitarian 
outrage emerged.   
Palmerston‟s response to the lack of progress through the 1830s was to turn at the end of the 
decade from a treaty based approach to a more robust unilateralism.  He authorised the 
seizure of all ships flying the Portuguese flag that were either carrying slaves or equipped for 
slaving but soon realised that in the absence of an international treaty this exposed British 
naval officers to the risk of being sued for illegal seizure.  Palmerston consequently sought 
the authority of parliament in order to indemnify the naval officers involved, resulting in the 
Slave Trade (Portugal) Bill (1839) which also lowered the threshold for capture by including 
a number of „equipment articles‟, extending the bounty for officers to vessels captured south 
of the equator and making provision for vessels to be taken to British vice-admiralty courts 
rather than the mixed commissions.
22
  The Bill enjoyed bipartisan support in the Commons 
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but was initially defeated in the Lords by Tory peers.  The „ultra‟ Tory Duke of Wellington 
invoked the Le Louis judgement to argue that the right of search was illegal in peacetime 
unless secured through treaty, protested that the authority to undertake what amounted to 
operations of war rested with the executive and not parliament, and that such actions risked 
„universal war‟ through provoking other maritime nations.  The bill did eventually pass but it 
was not long before the British navy, despite being at the height of its powers, was reminded 
that it could not simply excuse itself from the wider international legal system.   
In 1840 Captain Denman, operating under the authority of the new Act, blockaded a 
notorious slaving factory at Gallinas where he succeeded in capturing fifteen vessels, freeing 
800 slaves and destroying eight slave barracoons and the stores belonging to European slave 
dealers.  To the satisfaction of Palmerston and the Colonial Secretary, Lord John Russell, 
from mid-1839 through to mid-1842 the British squadrons inflicted considerable losses on the 
slave traders and caused a significant downturn in the volume of the Brazilian trade.
23
  There 
were also limited patrols off the Brazilian coast at this time which generated many complaints 
that innocent Brazilian ships were roughly searched as they left port stoking further 
nationalist resentment.  In one episode in which a British crew were imprisoned and 
humiliated after an incident at Campos, Britain responded by sending all available warships 
and warning of serious consequences should „the subaltern authorities guilty of such 
outrages‟ repeat such behaviour.24   
However, the Crown‟s own law officers could not be so readily checked for in May 1842 
they rescinded their support for Denman‟s actions and naval officers were instructed not to 
destroy slave factories in the absence of a formal agreement with the respective authority.  
                                                          
23
 Bethell, Abolition, pp183-4; Lloyd, ibid., 92-99. 
24
 Bethell, ibid., pp. 207, 204-13. 
13 
 
Lord Aberdeen, as Foreign Secretary in the Conservative Peel government that came to office 
in November 1841 was himself concerned by the legal and geopolitical implications of 
Palmerstonian methods and cautioned the Admiralty that „however desirable it may be to put 
an end to the slave trade, a good, however eminent, should not be attained otherwise than by 
lawful means‟.25 At this time, Denman himself faced legal action initiated by one of the slave 
traders at Gallinas for damages to property which, whilst eventually settled in Denman‟s 
favour, took six years to resolve and deterred further proactive naval action.
26
  By July 1844 
after further naval incidents and heated diplomatic exchanges British naval officers were 
specifically instructed not to make captures in Brazilian or West African waters without the 
agreement of the local authorities
27
 and, whilst the trade itself continued to flourish, the 
government‟s principal alternative to the preventive system had reached an impasse. 
There was, then, no easy option for government or civil society groups.  Whilst the 
preventive system was grounded in international law but largely ineffective Palmerston‟s 
unilateralism significantly raised the level of captures but could not escape the power of the 
law.  Given party-political and personality differences such naval unilateralism was in any 
case fundamentally unstable, subject both to the electoral cycle and competing schemes of 
British foreign policy as well as the prospective legal liability of naval personnel themselves.  
Whilst civil society groups were vital for mobilising and sustaining public support for the 
campaigns the specific projects they themselves advocated ended in farce.  The annexation 
option provided clear evidence of how an intervening Power can become increasingly 
entangled in an issue, despite the British reluctance to become encumbered with colonial 
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possessions and the associated costs.  Yet, as if this wasn‟t problem enough, during the 1840s 
public support declined as the prospect of cheaper sugar rivalled humanitarian sentiments.   
After the financial crisis of 1840-41 and greater competition for middle and working class 
votes both parties were more receptive to the arguments of the free traders.  For liberals and 
dissenters support for free trade in the campaign against the Corn Laws (promising a cheaper 
loaf) had dovetailed neatly with an assault on the powers of landed privilege.  However in the 
case of the sugar duties the slave trade and free trade campaigns stood in contradiction as 
many who were against the slave trade were also in favour of free trade, but the reduction of 
sugar duties would (and did) stimulate the slave trade as demand for cheaper grown sugar 
increased.  By the end of the decade the split was evident in parliament as the 1848 Commons 
Select Committee Inquiry chaired by the free trader William Hutt, M.P. recommended the 
withdrawal of the West African squadron.  By 1850 Hutt‟s motion to terminate Britain‟s anti-
slave trade treaty engagements and naval operations on the African coast found twice as 
much support as in 1848 and would have had more had Palmerston and Russell not 
threatened to resign.  One hundred and fifty four members (comprising 48 Liberal Whigs, 17 
Peelites and 89 Protectionists) voted to end Britain‟s efforts against two hundred and thirty 
two (176 Liberal Whigs, 23 Peelites and 33 Protectionists) to continue.
28
    
The issue of casualties was also pressed by Hutt and others leading Aberdeen to argue in the 
Lords that reports on the matter were greatly exaggerated and in the first half of 1847 loss of 
life in the squadron was less than two per cent which „is not such a loss as should make the 
country abandon efforts having so important an object in view‟.29 George Eden, the Earl of 
Auckland and First Lord of the Admiralty pointed out in support of the preventive system 
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that in 1845 mortality had been equal to 5% of the squadron and in 1846 the number of 
invalids equal to 10% but that these had fallen to 2% and 5% respectively by 1847.
30
  Philip 
Curtin, however, argues that the average was closer to 20%.
31
  As a point of current 
reference, the death rate in Afghanistan for British troops in the summer of 2008 spiked at 0.8 
per cent,
32
 and in conjunction with a perceived lack of clear strategic objectives became a 
high profile media issue, lending some support to the view that society is more casualty-
sensitive than in earlier periods.
33
        
Following the curtailment of unilateral operations and in particular the repeal of the sugar 
duties in 1846 the trade again increased.  The market was king, vindicating Buxton‟s 
comment that at the Customs House it was an axiom that „no illicit trade can be suppressed 
where the profit exceeds 30%‟.34  Whilst captures did increase the slave traders developed a 
sophisticated range of evasive and protective techniques: faster ships to outrun and slower, 
outdated ships as decoys; the forming of an association to minimise the impact of losses on 
any one trader; sailing under the stars and stripes as the US refused Britain the right of search 
and American enforcement efforts were weak; and, indeed, taking out insurance against 
capture. 
On top of this 1845 marked the date at which British rights under the 1817 treaty with 
Portugal expired and hence the entire basis of the preventive system was under threat.  It was 
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at this point that Aberdeen seized upon the „piracy‟ clause of the 1826 treaty.  Aberdeen was, 
however, keen to distinguish – at least in his own mind – his approach from that of 
Palmerston in 1839 and gained the support of the Law Officers for the unilateral seizure of 
suspected slaving ships and the right to try captured vessels in British Admiralty courts, 
subject to an act of parliament.  The Advocate General, Sir William Follett, was a „close 
friend of the Prime Minister‟ and Aberdeen was confident that the Law Officers would 
deliver „such an opinion as we desire‟.35  Passage through the Lords was smooth – Aberdeen 
had sought the consent of Wellington in advance – but embarrassingly the Commons returned 
the matter to the Admiralty and the Judge of the Prerogative Court for legal clarification.  A 
key concern was that Brazil had never passed a municipal statute declaring the slave trade as 
piracy and that the Brazilian executive could not make criminal law, which was the domain 
of the legislature.   Peel‟s argument in reply was that no such municipal statute was necessary 
as Brazil had acknowledged the slave trade as piracy in the 1826 treaty (and subsequently) 
and that piracy was an international crime punishable by all nations.  The Bill remained 
controversial but was passed on its third reading, only for the Law Officers themselves to 
subsequently indicate a lack of confidence in its legal validity in a departure from their initial 
support.
36
   
Nevertheless, in the Whig Ministry of July 1846 to December 1851 the force of the Aberdeen 
Act was brought to bear.  In 1849 Palmerston intensified the naval campaign on the Brazilian 
coast facilitated by the availability of ships hitherto servicing the blockade of Buenos Aires 
and the supply of regular, accurate intelligence from a well-placed local informant.  By June 
1850 British warships were regularly operating within Brazil‟s coastal waters visiting 
Brazilian ports and harbours and making forays onto land.  Seizures increased, as did 
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incidents such as that at Paranaguá where fire was exchanged between a Brazilian fort and a 
British warship.  Relations at this point were very tense and rumours were rife that 
Palmerston might impose a general blockade or even declare war.  Brazilian politics were 
pushed into crisis and in a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on 8 July the majority 
supported strong resistance against Britain.  But, three days later, after a full meeting of the 
Council of State, chaired by the Emperor, the process of abolition was initiated.  With a speed 
that astonished British contemporaries the trade was massively curtailed by the end of the 
year and virtually abolished by 1853.   
It is important, however, not to be deceived by the speed and immediate terms through which 
the trade was ended such as to reinforce the view that one can explain the outcome in terms 
solely of British agency and the use of naval power.  Palmerston‟s unilateralism had not 
succeeded in 1839 and it is quite possible that had the 1849/50 campaign not generated such a 
swift response by the Brazilian elite domestic political and legal support for the actions in 
Britain would have undermined the renewed unilateralist turn rendering it unsustainable.  
More importantly, however, „British‟ success in 1850 required certain specific developments 
within the target state, Brazil.    
 
The utility of force and the Brazilian dimension 
“In Brazil the eventual abolition of the slave trade depended on a favourable conjuncture of political 
and economic forces within the country as well as Palmerston‟s threats, although these were crucial to 
the timing of abolition”.37  
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At the time (as indeed now) interpretations of the trade‟s abolition were politicised.  The 
British government and the opposition liberals in Brazil explained it in terms of British 
pressure whilst the Brazilian government and opponents of the preventive system in Britain 
highlighted contemporary initiatives of the Brazilian government.  More recently, however, 
there has been greater convergence amongst historians on the view expressed by Miller above 
that explanation requires recognition of factors in both the intervening and the target party.  
Bethell, for example, states that „at the very least, British naval action could be said to have 
greatly accelerated, if it did not alone precipitate, Brazil‟s own, ultimately successful, efforts 
to suppress the slave trade‟38  Vitally, however, given the nature and scale of the task coupled 
with the limits of British power and reach it was only ever the Brazilian government that 
could ensure the long-term enforcement and administration of the closure of the trade.   
Slavery was integral to Brazil‟s socio-economic structure and whilst the nub of the system 
was the export-oriented plantations the cities also had a large slave labour force working as, 
for example, stevedores, porters, sedan chair carriers, sex workers, domestic servants, water 
and refuse carriers and some semi-skilled labour.  Harsh conditions and a preponderance of 
male over female slaves meant that the population was far from self-sustaining.
39
  The 
interests of the dominant merchant-planter class in the trade, the pervasiveness of slavery in 
Brazilian society, and the influence of the slave traders in Brazilian politics combined to 
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create strong forces capable of resisting, delaying or otherwise thwarting British efforts.  
Besides this, the Paranaguá incident had alarmed British naval officers and there was an 
element of bluff in the British position thereafter.  But more broadly the British presence was 
conditional on a number of factors that were themselves unstable, including robust political 
leadership, sustained public and parliamentary support, and the favourable state of South 
American affairs.   
The question remains, however, of the role and contribution of naval force in achieving 
abolition?  Actually, whilst Palmerston was not wholly right in this particular instance he did 
hold an astute sense of the way in which intervention (as a mode of force that alters the 
domestic balance of forces in a third state) might operate.  He argued that naval action would 
counterbalance the real and imagined grip of the slave traders on Brazilian politics and 
society.  Indeed, greater divisions had emerged as the planters had become increasingly 
indebted to the „foreign‟ Portuguese traders through long-term finance deals.  However, the 
Brazilian turn is more fully understood through „bigger‟ themes of interest, capacity and 
identity.     
Given that the British had applied pressure before what had changed by 1849/50?  In the 
1830s the Liberals were more willing than the Conservatives to suppress the trade
40
  but by 
the 1840s their efforts had collapsed and it was a Conservative government electorally and 
personally connected to the merchant-planter class and which publicly defended slavery that 
abolished it.   There was little to suggest that abolition at this point was in any way 
„inevitable‟: as a counter-factual if the Liberals had been in office in 1850 „the realities of the 
era suggest that the result would have been British pressure, Brazilian protest and 
ineffectiveness, British armed intervention, and Brazilian resistance, political chaos, and 
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military conflict‟.41  Indeed, it was the ineffectiveness of the Liberal administrations of the 
quinqueno liberal from 1844-48 that led Palmerston to return to coercive unilateralism.  To 
understand the Conservative government‟s decision analyses must consider both the will and 
the capacity of the Brazilian government to effect change. 
Whilst the question of „will‟ can be readily understood in immediate cost-benefit terms as 
explained below this should be set against the point that the „rationality‟ of particular choices 
is itself conditional upon the Brazilian elite‟s wider political and cultural assumptions 
regarding Brazil‟s „place in the world‟, or identity, and the behaviour most likely to realise 
such a vision.  This will in turn be evident in how Brazil engaged with such historically 
specific material and ideational factors as the international economy, the normative and 
cultural character of a Eurocentric international society, and the appeal of (and confidence in) 
„the state‟ as a modern political unit.  Then, the ability and competence of the state to pursue 
its desired path is a matter of possessing the necessary „capacity‟. 
Within Brazil the 1830s were a period of severe political violence and instability and it was 
not until the late 1840s that the state had sufficiently consolidated its capacity and reach and 
had a sufficiently strong government to be in the position to effect its will on such an 
important and fundamental matter as the slave trade.  The 1850 crisis may, then, be regarded 
as a moment of coerced synchronisation in which naval force broke the impasse in Brazilian 
politics and impelled the Brazilian elite to concentrate on „bigger‟ political-strategic issues of 
interest and identity at a moment when Brazil probably for the first time was strong enough 
as a state to implement and enforce its will on this question.  This can be better understood 
through showing how the specific decision rests upon such bigger questions. 
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The Council of State on 11 July 1850 came to the view that a protracted conflict with Britain, 
let alone war, would be disastrous for Brazil.  Brazil‟s commerce would be paralysed and 
this, in turn, would hit public revenues; the slaves might be encouraged to revolt; the recent 
period of internal stability might be threatened; and in anticipation of the future conflict with 
Argentina, the prospect of Britain as an adversary was especially troubling.  The Foreign 
Minister, Paulino, put these points to the Chamber and told the deputies that Brazil had little 
choice.  It was in any case, he said, the traders that profited most from the trade; the planters 
would simply have to adapt (which was a prospect softened by the possibilities of an internal 
market in slaves).  He argued also that persistence with the trade had led Brazil to become 
isolated internationally and that in the longer term it would be impossible and shameful to 
maintain it.  Noting that the rest of the civilised world was now opposed to the trade he asked, 
rhetorically, “can we resist the torrent?”.42   
Needell is persuasive in arguing that the Conservatives „chose their state over their long-term 
access to slave labour‟ through situating this specific decision in their wider struggle for 
socio-political order.
 43
  The Brazilian Conservatives had earlier been part of a broad liberal 
opposition to the Portuguese Court and their allies after their arrival in 1808.  The opposition 
was held together by a common support for constitutional reform to satisfy Brazilian 
nationalism but at key junctures they shifted rightward and when joined by the restorationists 
and regional oligarchs of the first reign in 1833 represented a consolidated body of merchant-
planter interests.   
Their political character was shaped by both European and Brazilian considerations such that 
Brazilian „exceptionalism‟ was marked by the need to adapt rather than imitate the liberal 
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constitutional and political models of Europe or the United States, with the predominant 
influence tending to be the European conservative-constitutional right rather than full blown 
monarchism.  Many were schooled in constitutional theory and influenced in particular by the 
French conservative-liberal constitutionalist, Guizot.  The 1824 constitution itself was 
modelled on the ideas of Benjamin Constant and „analogous to that of the French 
constitutional monarchy during the first half of the nineteenth century‟.44  Whilst the emperor 
had a „moderative‟ power which included the right to dissolve parliament, call for new 
elections, form cabinets and appoint senators, the support of the Chamber was regarded as 
important for the legitimacy of the government and to guard against „prince and priest‟. 45  In 
practice, however, election fraud was routine and the system worked to „ensure the influence 
of the elite within a larger society dominated by patronage and hierarchical networks of 
influence‟.46   
The question of state structure marked a major point of difference between liberals and 
conservatives and was central to the question of state-capacity.  During the 1830s the liberal 
reformist moderado government under Fejió introduced the Additional Act (1834) which 
drew from the federal structure of the United States and was intended to mark a departure 
from the centralized and authoritarian practices of the monarchy through giving greater 
power to the provinces and diffusing the power of the executive.  The unintended 
consequences of this decentralisation, however, were to fuel a violent competition for power 
in the provinces (as well as stimulate the consolidation of conservative forces noted above) in 
a decade characterised by major political turmoil and violence.  The National Guard too was 
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formed in this period but soon lost its intended democratic character as the respective militias 
increasingly became controlled by local merchant-planter interests. 
Indeed, the „perception and reality of state power were probably weaker in 1835 than they 
had ever been in the nation‟s history‟.47  The weak governments of the moderados faced a 
series of restorationist and radical exaltado coups; in the southernmost province of Rio 
Grande do Sul there began a secessionist war that lasted a decade whilst in the northern 
Amazonian province of Pará there began a six year race and class war in which perhaps a 
fifth of the population were killed.  In Bahia the most serious of a number of slave revolts in 
the province occurred as captives attempted to seize the capital and in the ports of the 
fluminense political heartland around Rio and elsewhere violence was also commonplace, 
particularly at election times.  Between 1832 and 1838 there were five major provincial 
revolts.
 48
  Clearly, then, amidst such turmoil the Brazilian government was hardly well-
positioned to respond effectively to British demands for the closure of the Atlantic slave 
trade.  In 1837 the Marques de Barbacena sought to curb the trade whilst also protecting the 
interests of the planters through increasing efforts to capture slave ships whilst 
decriminalising the purchase of slaves once they were on Brazilian soil.  This, however, 
failed to impress either the pro-planter majority of deputies or the smaller number with 
abolitionist sentiments.
49
  
Upon returning to office in 1837 the Conservatives undertook a process of recentralisation, 
through reform of the Additional Act, establishing increased state control over the local 
judiciary and the restoration of the Council of State – recall how influential this was in the 
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Brazilian decision to close the trade – through which the monarch could exert influence.  
During the 1840s, whilst violence was still widespread and the propertied classes generally 
fearful for their position, the country developed a more stable and effective state due not least 
to the crowning of the new emperor, Dom Pedro II.  By 1842 the reactionaries had defeated a 
series of provincial revolts through the combined use of the police and the national guards, 
highlighting the increasingly effective bond between the Conservatives, the state, and the 
merchant-planter class.
50
 In short, the Conservatives returned to office in 1848 forming „the 
strongest and most stable [government] that Brazil had known since independence‟.51  
At this time also the state developed an institutional capacity that it had hitherto lacked and 
which was vital if the Atlantic slave trade was to be permanently abolished.  The 
recentralising reforms were becoming increasingly effective and the last of the provincial 
revolts in Pernambuco (1948-49) was suppressed and the internal security apparatus 
expanded and became better organised.  Financially Brazil resisted British pressure to renew 
the commercial treaty and Brazilian tariffs thereafter comprised approximately half of the 
government‟s revenue, enabling for example the development of the navy which was to be 
available for anti-slave patrols.  Indeed, both Bethell and Needell argue on the basis of an 
internal memorandum from Eusébio, the Minister of Justice, in which he authorised police 
actions against local traders that Brazil had already started to close the trade prior to the 
intensification of British pressure in January 1850.
52
  This indication of Brazilian will to shut 
down slave trade corresponds with the view that the end of the regency and commencement 
of Dom Pedro II‟s reign, alongside the Conservative‟s reforms, contributed to the self-
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conscious turn amongst key figures in the elite away from the old colonial system so that 
Brazil could take its place in the „modern world‟.   
The Conservatives, then, had developed the state so as to serve their general class and 
ideological interests and were willing to sacrifice the Atlantic slave trade and adapt so as to 
protect their achievements.  These state-building endeavours were, however, part of a wider 
political, social and cultural development process undertaken in relation to a European model 
that they regarded as both desirable and, mutatis mutandis, credibly attainable.  French 
political influence has been noted above.  The constitutional empire was regarded by 
Brazilians as a progressive entity that had managed to reign in autocratic power whilst at the 
same time avoiding the scale of disorder common to the neighbouring republics.  Culturally, 
the Brazilian elite „aspired to be an outpost of European culture and civilisation‟ and 
economically Brazil‟s „ports were more closely linked to Europe than they were to their own 
hinterlands‟.53 European demand for coffee, sugar and cotton ensured a thriving trade 
between the two regions and the emperor increasingly came to regard international commerce 
as fundamental to Brazil‟s strategic development.  Normatively too, whilst the Brazilian 
conservatives professed the „exceptionalism‟ of Brazil‟s development, they were unavoidably 
bound in the wider body of moral-cultural standards that had developed against the slave 
trade – under British leadership – and which bore upon strategic considerations.  It did not go 
unnoticed, for example, that despite the dubious legality of British actions Brazil was unable 
to find a single other state to come to its support during this period of intense crisis.
54
  Whilst 
many of the merchant-planter class were more concerned by the trade‟s implications for the 
racial balance and the „Africanisation‟ of Brazil than for the rights of slaves, the trade did 
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leave the elite morally isolated internationally and falling behind the standards of the 
„civilised world‟ in which they believed they belonged.   
The Brazilian elite‟s particular form of conservative-liberal modernism provided, then, the 
environment in which naval intervention could serve as the mechanism or trigger of coercive 
harmonisation or synchronisation: the act of intervention pushed the Brazilian elite further in 
a direction they were already moving as distinct from presenting an existential challenge to 
state or class interests.  This may not have assuaged the immediate affront to Brazilian 
honour but it did break the deadlock in Brazilian politics and society on this question and led 
to Brazil conforming to the normative standards of contemporary international society.  
Accordingly, it was the extent of historically specific political, economic and cultural 
complementarities, coupled with the development of state capacities in the 1840s, which 
created conditions in which the intervention could force the impasse that had characterised 
earlier British and Brazilian efforts to abolish the Atlantic slave trade.   
 
Myths and Lessons Revisited 
Given the political difficulties and operational dilemmas of liberal intervention and military 
humanitarianism in the present day the ultimate success of the slave trade campaign warrants 
a fresh examination, especially given that in some quarters the campaign is proffered as a 
„model‟ or even a rallying cry.  The discussion so far has shown that the question of success 
is significantly more complex than is sometimes suggested and that an emphasis on the role 
of the intervener and military force at the expense of the place of the „target‟ state and 
political-social developments therein is misleading.  The question of „lessons‟ for the present 
day may be considered in light of several central themes and issues pertaining to liberal 
interventionism: the political support base for military intervention, the role of political 
27 
 
parties and the question of public opinion, liberalism‟s normative indeterminacy, the place of 
law, and the utility of force.   
That the political base of support for the slave trade campaign held up for forty years in the 
face of limited success is remarkable, particularly given the potential opportunities for an 
opposition party to exploit the issue for electoral reasons.  Kaufmann and Pape explained the 
duration of the campaign through the fine electoral balance between the parties, particularly 
after the 1832 Reform Act, in which there was a premium upon the votes of the humanitarian 
lobby.  Slavery issues continued to have a high profile amongst the public and civil society 
organisations, which coupled with a group of committed supporters in parliament, kept the 
campaign alive.  In the present age, however, despite some close fought elections in the 
United States and Britain over the past two decades it is difficult to think of a global moral 
issue (for which military humanitarianism might be an appropriate response) that could have 
such extensive electoral appeal.  The issues of human rights and humanitarian intervention 
exposed deep differences between the Labour and Conservative parties in Britain and 
particularly the Republicans and Democrats in the US during the 1990s – even when faced 
with genocide – where the issue became an ideological battleground over national interest 
and identity in which Republicans disparagingly referred to Clinton‟s foreign policy as a type 
of „social work‟ removed from the „national interest‟.55  But even for Democrats the limits of 
support were soon exposed by the withdrawal of troops from Somalia after the loss of 18 
Rangers in 1993, therein foreclosing the political possibility of intervention to prevent 
genocide in Rwanda the following year in which an estimated 800,000 people lost their lives.  
Indeed, that political debate about intervention tends to be pinched by questions of exit 
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strategy and timetables makes it difficult for politicians to publicly argue for a long-term 
campaign.   
 
There is, however, a paradox between the apparent political sensitivity to casualties in 
humanitarian missions and public opinion surveys which indicate that, for example, the 
American public is often favourably inclined towards the use of American power for 
humanitarian purposes or to prevent genocide.
56
  Such findings led writers such as 
MacDonald to argue that the barriers to US intervention and imperialism have been 
overstated.
57
  The paradox is readily resolved, however, when understood in light of what, 
besides the principal policy objective or purpose of the mission is the other key determinant 
of public support: that the policy is perceived to be successful.
58
 In the case of humanitarian 
intervention there is no escaping from the fact that the specific crisis or atrocities that may 
trigger an intervention are generally manifestations of much deeper ongoing social and 
political problems that are in their nature extraordinarily difficult to address and which have 
the capacity to draw in the intervener ever more deeply.  As such whilst an initial clarity of 
objectives may exist, this is often exposed by subsequent developments as superficial or naïve 
and the precursor to a deeper involvement and so-called „mission creep‟. 
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The sugar duties issue highlighted the vulnerability of public support for humanitarian 
missions when faced with countervailing material pressures.  Liberalism as a normative 
project gives little direct guidance here as both the abolition and free trade campaigns 
represented liberal „goods‟.  But the issue also points to the fact of deeper historical 
transitions in the character of different epochs, within which the prospects and possibilities 
for humanitarian commitments will vary.  Curtin makes the point that the failure of the Niger 
expedition, the reduction in the sugar duties and the fall of the Whig government in 1852 
marked the „end of the humanitarian age‟ which began in the second half of the eighteenth 
century.  Indeed, interest in Africa waned until the post-Darwin (1859) resurgence of interest 
in the age of imperialism that marked the later decades of the century and in which harder-
headed security driven considerations prevailed.
59
  This observation invites reflection on the 
character of the current age and in particular the extent to which the 9/11 attacks marked the 
turn away from humanitarianism – or at the very least its increasing securitization – towards a 
more security oriented epoch in which humanitarianism and questions of human rights are 
increasingly squeezed.  It would be wrong to say that the liberal response – that human rights 
provide the basis for long-term security – goes unheard, but it remains secondary to geo-
economic and geo-strategic considerations such that charges of „selectivity‟ or „double-
standards‟ are manifestations of a structural-hierarchy of objectives in the foreign policies of 
the most powerful liberal states.   
The tension between competing liberal goods highlighted by the sugar duties is not, however, 
the only area in which liberalism does not offer clear normative guidelines.  At the heart of 
the Le Louis case were the competing claims of sovereignty and cosmopolitanism which 
continues to structure liberal debates on the use of force as apparent in the case of the Kosovo 
intervention (1999) in which the debate was framed in terms of the tension between 
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(sovereignty based) „legality‟ and (cosmopolitan) „legitimacy‟.60  The effect of this normative 
indeterminacy or ambivalence is to produce a fairly formulaic debate between competing 
conceptions of the rightful use of force and the principles of foreign policy, effectively 
allowing the outcome to be decided by political or strategic considerations.   
Prominent in the above account of the campaign was the place of „law‟.  Wheeler makes the 
point that whilst international law provides the „rules of the game‟ which players recognise, 
internalise and may seek to exploit, it is still intimately bound up with the political process.
61
 
In this case it is the interplay between international law and liberal domestic political 
institutions, notably an independent judiciary and a sphere for public legal debate, which 
creates an extra mechanism or dimension through which international law can exercise 
political influence.  The reaction against Palmerston‟s unilateral turn in 1839 and the 
Aberdeen Act in 1845 shows that whilst in the short-term the executive might prevail, in the 
medium term it could not hijack the legal process or dominate the judiciary.  As such, in 
political terms Palmerston‟s extra-legal actions were inherently unstable insofar as they relied 
on his own exceptionally robust leadership, could not muster cross-party consensus, and were 
vulnerable to a change of government.  Hence whilst international law is sometimes 
dismissed as an influence on state behaviour due to the lack of enforcement machinery, when 
taken in conjunction with liberal domestic political institutions it offers a further degree of 
accountability and constraint.  Beyond this, the legal status of British actions was itself 
regarded as important given the possibility of legal claims against individual naval officers. 
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At the same time, however, that the power of law in conjunction with domestic political 
considerations can have paradoxical consequences can be illustrated by President Obama‟s 
efforts to carve out a post-Bush strategy regarding the use of force.  Whilst he has tempered 
the use of harsh interrogation techniques the efforts to close the Guantanamo detention centre 
in Cuba have met with considerable congressional opposition and at the time of writing 
remains in use.  The legal difficulties of what to do with captured suspects appears to be one 
reason behind the emergence of a „kill-not-capture‟ policy and in particular the use of 
unmanned remote controlled drones to launch missile strikes which has increased under 
Obama.
 62
  One can recognise, then, that whilst Obama holds different policy preferences than 
did Bush, the complexities of domestic political and international legal factors can level or 
distort these. 
The 2003 Iraq War, whilst not principally a „humanitarian‟ intervention, illustrated not only 
the pressure law officers can face from executive agencies but also the difficulty executive 
agencies face in trying to control the law.  Thus in London on the eve of the war the Attorney 
General faced enormous pressure to revise his view of the legality of an invasion without 
further legal authorisation from the United Nations Security Council.  After protests from the 
Chief of the Armed Forces the senior legal adviser at the Foreign Office stated in a 
confidential memorandum reminiscent of the Denman case that „unless the Attorney-General 
agrees that there is a proper legal basis for military action, individual members of the Armed 
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Forces and civilian officials would also be potentially liable for charges of murder‟.63  In the 
medium-term, however, the controversial nature of the Attorney General‟s last-minute 
support for the war came under widespread criticism from the wider legal community which 
undermined trust in the institution itself.
64
  
There is also the question of the „utility of force‟ upon which there has been much interest in 
the post-Cold period due to perceived changes in the nature and objectives of war.  In 
particular is the claim that „old‟ wars marked by state-centric industrial warfare for political 
goals have been superseded by „new‟ wars marked by non-state combatants, low-tech 
weaponry, and driven by political-economic, ethno-nationalist or ideological logics.
65
  
Liberal interventions in this period have not been against the physical integrity or existence of 
the target states per se, but against either certain ruling elites that are deemed to have misused 
their power and authority or in circumstances where states have „collapsed‟ or are otherwise 
unable to maintain effective governance within their territories.  Such interventions have been 
intended as temporary (and ideally brief) operations either to force a change of government or 
regime in the target state or else to compel the existing government to desist from civil 
violence and the violation of human or minority rights.  In many of these conflicts there is a 
clear conceptual contradiction: the „military‟ instrument of foreign policy is applied to 
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address what are at root political and societal problems of order or governance.  This has led 
to a steep learning curve – with the ICISS report The Responsibility to Protect being one 
product of this – and the need to ask searching questions about what the utility of force 
actually is in circumstances where state institutions may have collapsed and/or governments 
or armed groups are behaving abominably towards fellow citizens or neighbours.
66
 
In the case of the British anti-slave trade campaign it is clear that for long periods the use of 
naval force was ineffective in suppressing the trade.  When the use of force did make a 
difference was when Brazil was itself emerging from a protracted period of civil-political 
violence, had progressed in the building and consolidation of state capacities, and had a 
strong government which subscribed to the „modern state‟ project and believed that Brazil – 
and key class interests therein – had a positive future in the expanding international economy.  
It was then, in this case, the „state‟ and the „international economy‟ that provided the 
institutional bases for peace.  In the present age the importance of a soundly administered 
territorial area is generally well-understood but it is clear that the international community (as 
Peel above) is still engaged in its own „experimentation‟ on how best to achieve this aim and 
there is no single alternative to the unified Weberian state, which has in any case always been 
problematic in the post-colonial world.   
As such, it is one thing for President Obama to proclaim, for example, that „Africa doesn‟t 
need strongmen, it needs strong institutions‟67 and quite another to identify what form such 
                                                          
66 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, (London: Allen Lane, 2005); Jan 
Angstrom & Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds.), „Exploring the Utility of Armed Force in Modern Conflict‟, special 
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institutions will take, how they might be developed, and what role (if any) military force 
might play in the process.  There are presently a range of approaches to stabilising territory 
and developing governance ranging from the large-scale involvement of international 
political and economic agencies in the departments and agencies of weak or failing states, 
schemes of trusteeship, membership of a wider confederation such as the EU, or some 
combination thereof.   
If one takes the specific case of Afghanistan, for example, one can see that, as in Brazil for 
much of the nineteenth century campaign, the military cog of naval enforcement and 
compulsion was not in synchrony with the political cog of state capacity building.  The 
military campaign operates on a politically-determined time-span that is shorter than 
estimates of the time-span required to develop sufficient state and governmental capacity in 
Afghanistan, if that is actually a feasible objective.
 68
  Yet without close harmonisation of the 
military with the political timelines the military presence risks becoming dislocated from its 
political rationale, self-perpetuating, and counter-productive as the friction of a military 
presence incurs political, social and ethical costs.  Getting the timing „right‟, however, is 
itself an intrinsically difficult thing to do.        
 
Conclusion 
The discussion began by showing how current references to the British anti-slave trade 
campaign offer distorted accounts of the trade‟s abolition through neglecting the role of the 
target society, over-emphasising the role of force, and under-estimating the specific political 
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circumstances and wider socio-historical milieu that limits its relevance as a model for the 
present age.  This is not to say, however, that there are no parallels or „lessons‟ and in this 
regard the central theme has been to view these through the three-way relationship between 
the institutional and cultural character of a liberal state, political conditions in the target state, 
and the utility of force.  Clear, for example, from Tony Blair‟s Chicago speech69 is that the 
moral impetus for action is a residual feature of liberal foreign policy discourse.  At the same 
time however, the slave-trade and contemporary cases illustrate that liberal institutions and 
culture condition the use of force by states such as to exercise significant political constraints.  
Often liberal interventions lack the resources to sufficiently penetrate state or society to 
achieve the political objectives and hence the cooperation of the target government (or some 
other group) is likely to be required in order to fit the target into the intervener‟s scheme of 
things.  It was in this sense that intervention was presented as a form of coercive co-operation 
between intervener and target. 
On the question of the „utility of force‟ the case is informative for both doves and hawks.  For 
doves, it demonstrates that military pressure can produce a decisive moment – in this case the 
crisis that broke the impasse in Brazilian politics – which in turn pushed the Brazilian elite to 
close down the trade.  For hawks, it demonstrates the limits and contingencies of force 
insofar as an effective local actor possessing both the capacity as well as the will was 
required to administer and enforce the objectives.   
Through factoring in conditions in the target state rather than focusing solely on the 
intervener a further complication for the use of force becomes apparent: synchronizing or co-
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ordinating the use of force with political conditions in the target and in the intervening state.  
In the case above whilst naval operations did at times create a political space for action, in the   
medium to long term political considerations conditioned the military operations.  Without 
this three-way synchronisation of the military with domestic political constraints and with 
political conditions in the target – lacking throughout most of the campaign – there is a 
danger that the military asset will be squandered or have unintended, counter-productive 
consequences.  Key, then, is the primacy of the political.  The burden of this discussion has 
been to elaborate upon the residual complexities and contingencies of liberal (military) 
intervention and the importance of the wider political and social context such as to suggest 
that military interventions should be undertaken sparingly, if at all.  
